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Abstract
It has long been speculated that banning parties from participation in elections may
be counterproductive because it might provoke societal resistance. Using the
European Social Survey (2002–2010; N¼ 195,405), our study suggests otherwise. We
demonstrate that party bans enjoy the legitimacy of majority support. This holds
true irrespective of countries’ resilience to extremist influences (or lack thereof)
resulting from “institutional intolerance,” electoral entry barriers and authoritarian
legacies. Individual orientations toward the democratic establishment do matter to a
small extent: citizens with authoritarian tendencies and low system support are less
supportive, while this is less so for citizens with extremist ideological orientations.
Even though party bans entail significant democratic dilemmas, this study reveals so-
cietal resources supportive of repressive responses to extremist parties.
Introduction1
In his famous appeal against fascism in 1937, German émigré Karl Loewenstein warned
that democracy may become the “Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the city”
(1937, p. 424). The Nazis’ rise to power in Weimar Germany has provided the
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paradigmatic case of political extremists overthrowing democracy under the ruse of
respecting legality. Since then, various democracies have recalled these tactics to justify
militant responses to political extremism, including association bans and the criminal-
ization of offensive speech acts (see, e.g., Bleich, 2011; Capoccia, 2005; Downs, 2012).
By far the most repressive measure is banning political parties from participation in
elections, or “party bans.” Even though justified as measures to defend democracy by
those supporting bans, party bans challenge principles of political tolerance and under-
mine the level playing field of electoral competition. In addition to these normative
dilemmas, one of the prime arguments fielded against their use is that they do more
harm than good, among other things because they might provoke societal resistance
(Bleich, 2011, pp. 101–103; Downs, 2012, p. 48). Societal resistance includes radicaliza-
tion, and increased voter support and/or electoral success for extremist parties. Party
bans are therefore typically approached with caution.
Party bans are an infrequent, but not unusual phenomenon in Europe. In an expert
survey of party ban practices in 37 European democracies, Bourne and Casal Bértoa
(2017) show that the majority of these countries banned a party at some point during
the post-war period and that in total 52 parties were banned. Prominent party ban cases
include: the German Socialist Reichspartei (1952) and the Communist Party (1956);
Sinn Fein (1956) in Northern Ireland; the Dutch Centre Party ‘86 (1998); Batasuna in
Spain (2003); the Belgian Flemish Block (2004); and the Workers Party in the Czech
Republic (2010). Combined, these events have ignited public and scholarly interest in
the consequences of party bans. Nevertheless, no study has assessed citizen attitudes to-
ward party bans. This is an important shortcoming, given that academics, political
elites, and the media have warned that party bans may be counterproductive because
they might provoke societal resistance.
Research on citizen attitudes provides knowledge on whether elite positions on an
issue as fundamental as who is permitted to contest political power enjoys the legitimacy
of citizen support. It also permits us to reflect on whether potential costs in terms of soci-
etal resistance outweigh potential benefits such as the reaffirmation of democratic values.
To this end, we ask: to what degree is the public divided over the use of party bans? And
does opposition to party bans vary in accordance with countries’ resilience to political ex-
tremism and individual orientations toward the democratic establishment? We address
these questions by analyzing opinion data from the European Social Survey (ESS;
N¼ 195,405) between 2002 and 2010 in 27 European countries. Although not subjected
to analysis before, questions on attitudes to party bans have been regularly posed in ESS.
First, we map the aggregate levels of support for party bans in European countries, after
which we explain this support in function of country and individual characteristics.
Theory and Hypotheses
Militant Democracy and Party Bans
After the Second World War, European democracies faced the question of how to pro-
tect the democratic order against extremist influences. One answer was found in the lit-
erature on “militant democracy.” First coined by Loewenstein (1937), militant
democracy entails the protection of democratic freedoms by pre-emptively curtailing
the rights of those trying to subvert it, for instance, by means of antiracism legislation
or association bans (Bleich, 2011; Bourne, 2018; Capoccia, 2005; Downs, 2012). By far
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the most repressive measure is banning a party from participation in elections, thereby
partially or fully exclusing it from the public sphere.
In addition to the normative dilemmas surrounding their implementation, party
bans spark controversy because they might provoke societal resistance. In this respect, it
is often argued that this potential cost should be taken into account along with two other
pragmatic considerations, namely, how capable a country is of defending itself against,
and recovering from, extremist successes (i.e., resilience), and which types of citizens
oppose bans (Minkenberg, 2006).
Countries’ Resilience to Extremist Influences
Citizen support for party bans should first be weighed against countries’ ability to de-
fend themselves against, and recover from, extremist influences. One important source
of resilience is constraints on the ability of extremist parties to reach positions of polit-
ical authority. In this section, we theorize how different dimensions of resilience influ-
ence public support for party bans.
Institutional tolerance toward political extremism. One of the principal
contributions by legal scholars to the literature on democratic defense is the construc-
tion of typologies of legal-constitutional responses (see Fox & Nolte, 2000). The
“procedural model” draws on Schumpeter’s (1947) conception of democracy and holds
that parties’ legitimacy is derived from their electoral support, which limits public au-
thority to restrict extremist views. Legitimacy in “substantive democracies,” by con-
trast, draws on Mill, Rawls, Popper, and others in its insistence that rights should not
be used to abolish other people’s rights. Parties that support the abolition of other peo-
ple’s rights can therefore be denied access to the electoral realm.
There is an extensive literature linking public opinion to institutional traditions.
Most notable is the “representative model of judicial decision making,” which states that
the behavior of legal institutions can be attributed to the environment in which they oper-
ate (Cook, 1977; Gibson, 1980). If this is the case, institutional commitments to “open de-
bate and competition among all ideological factions [even extremist ones]” (Fox & Nolte,
2000, p. 200) in procedural democracies is the result of a wider societal consensus that no
voices should be excluded. In substantive democracies, institutional willingness to curtail
the rights of political extremists should follow a wider societal commitment to maintaining
conditions for cultural tolerance. In light of these arguments, we expect that:
H1: Citizens living in “substantive democracies” are more supportive of party bans
than citizens living in “procedural democracies.”
Authoritarian legacies. Many have also linked historical experiences of authoritarian-
ism (e.g., Nazism, fascism, and Communism) to countries’ resilience against extremist
influences. Such arguments are often inspired by the paradigmatic case of German
“militant democracy” (Backes, 2006), in which the legacy of Nazism justified the imple-
mentation of constitutional provisions aimed at marginalizing extremist influences. In some
comparative studies, this observation has been generalized into the argument that the deep-
seated traumas these regimes left behind resulted in strong institutional pressures to create
a definitive rupture with the past (Downs, 2012, p. 106; Klamt, 2007, p. 154).
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The relation between authoritarian legacies and public support for party bans, how-
ever, is much more ambiguous. On the one hand, work by some scholars (Bourne, 2012;
Bourne & Casal Bértoa, 2017) suggests that party bans are more frequently deployed in
situations where they are likely to be met with societal resistance. This is especially the
case in new democracies, where a substantial share of the population may still support
authoritarian forms of government. In this context, party bans may serve as a necessary
but contentious instrument to eliminate the remnants of authoritarianism. We can
therefore expect that:
H2a: Citizens living in countries with recent experiences with authoritarianism are less
willing to support party bans than citizens living elsewhere.
On the other hand, in established democracies with past experiences with authoritarian-
ism the traumatizing records of the past may underpin a convincing narrative that helps
to justify the necessity of militant measures (de Leeuw, Rekker, Azrout, & Van Spanje,
2019). Support for party bans in these countries may therefore be higher than else-
where. We therefore expect that:
H2b: Citizens living in countries with distant experiences with authoritarianism are
more supportive of party bans than citizens living elsewhere.
Electoral entry barriers. If an antisystem party can be kept from exercising a
meaningful role in parliamentary or governmental arenas, it is likely that citizens will
not consider it sufficiently threatening to warrant a ban. Among the most potent tools
to prevent extremist parties from exercising any power whatsoever is the manipulation
of electoral rules. The entry barriers resulting from these rules, then, would serve as a
viable alternative to party bans.
Evidence for such considerations can be found in debates about banning the
German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in 2017. The Federal
Constitutional Court ended up rejecting the ban—among other things—because the
5% legal threshold for parliamentary representation resulted in a limited electoral show-
ing of this party, thereby limiting its threat to the democratic order (Bourne, 2018, pp.
140–141). A more general reasoning has been made with respect to the proportionality
of electoral systems, with highly proportional systems enabling the election of small
(radical) parties. A key example is the French Front National (now National Rally),
which performed well under a system of proportional representation but lost its mo-
mentum after the reintroduction of a majoritarian system (Downs, 2012, pp. 65–66).
This makes party bans more desirable in countries with highly proportional systems,
like Israel, but less so in the United States, with its plurality system (Navot, 2008, p.
747; Pedahzur & Weinberg, 2004, p. 118).
If extremist parties experience difficulties gaining electoral ground, it is plausible
that citizens feel less inclined to identify political extremism as a realistic threat. In add-
ition, citizens living in countries with low electoral barriers are more likely to have wit-
nessed extremist parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena. This, then, may
reinforce the perception that it is necessary to curb extremist influences by means of
legal measures. We therefore expect that:
H3: Citizens living in countries with low entry barriers for electoral representation are
more supportive of party bans than citizens in countries with high barriers.
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Individual Orientation toward the Democratic Establishment
A second point requiring further scrutiny is the question of which types of citizens op-
pose party bans. In this section, we theorize that citizens with more negative orienta-
tions toward the existing democratic order are also the least supportive of party bans.
Authoritarian tendencies. Several studies on “authoritarian socialization” propose
that citizens are less supportive of democratic government—and by extension of meas-
ures designed to protect it—when they grew up in a context where authoritarianism is
promoted as a viable form of government (Neundorf, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Tucker,
2017). Authoritarian tendencies may then continue throughout individuals’ lifespans,
because the ideas acquired during preadulthood tend to remain stable afterwards
(Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). Therefore, it is plausible that citizens who grew up under au-
thoritarian rule are also less willing to support measures designed to protect democracy.
In line with these arguments, we expect that:
H4: Citizens socialized under authoritarian rule are less supportive of party bans than
citizens socialized thereafter.
Ideological extremism. Another possibility is that support for party bans is steered
by strategic considerations, an idea borrowed from earlier research on elite strategies of
exclusion. Van Spanje (2010, p. 356), for instance, argues that mainstream parties are
less likely to ostracize parties with similar ideological convictions, since they may be po-
tential coalition partners. On the other hand, Müller (2005) suggests that parties may
benefit from bans against ideologically proximate parties, because they are most likely to
attract their contenders’ supporters in subsequent elections. In a similar vein, it can be
argued that citizens’ support for party bans is influenced by strategic considerations.
That is, it is plausible that support is lowest among citizens whose ideological preferen-
ces are most likely to be restricted by means of a ban, that is, citizens maintaining
extremist beliefs. We can therefore expect that:
H5: Citizens with extreme right- and left-leaning ideological orientations are less sup-
portive of party bans.
System support. Support for party bans is also likely to be linked to individuals’ sys-
tem support in two ways. First, the implementation of party bans typically requires the
involvement of various institutions, including governments, parliaments, and the judiciary
as the final arbiter. However professional they may be, public officials may be steered by
various motivations, some of which may be related to their partisan alignment. This
means that citizens’ belief in their ability to make adequate and appropriate decisions on
this topic comes down to whether they believe public officials live up to moral standards,
such as impartiality and integrity. Second, system support also reflects individuals’ sup-
port for law compliance (Marien & Hooghe, 2011). Citizens with high system support,
and by extension high adherence to norms of law compliance, have lower levels of toler-
ance toward those challenging the legal status quo and may be more willing to implement
measures to prevent them from doing so. We therefore expect that:
H6: Citizens with high levels of system support are more supportive of party bans.
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Data and Methods
Data: European Social Survey
To test our hypotheses, we use all waves of the ESS (2002–2010) containing a measure
of support for party bans (2002–2010). To our knowledge, this is the only cross-national
dataset that includes such a measurement. To ensure that all models in our analyses in-
clude the same countries, we restrict our analyses to the 27 countries for which we have
information about their previous experience with party bans and their institutional trad-
ition. Data were collected through a representative random sample of the population
(aged 15 and up), using face-to-face interviewing techniques. This resulted in a sample
of 195,405 respondents in 27 countries with an overall response rate of 70%.
Dependent Variable: Support for Party Bans
Support for party bans was measured by asking respondents to what degree they agreed
with the statement that “parties wishing to overthrow democracy should be banned,”
ranging between 1 “completely agree” and 5 “completely disagree.” This was subse-
quently recoded to a 0–4 scale, with higher values indicating higher levels of support.
Given the specificity of this question, this single item should suffice to draw conclusions
with respect to support for party bans.
Independent Variables
Country-level variables. To identify institutional tolerance toward political ex-
tremism, we use data compiled by Bourne and Casal Bértoa (2017, pp. 234–236). These
scholars distinguish between procedural democracies, with high levels of tolerance to-
ward extremism, and substantive democracies, with low levels of tolerance. Second, we
use the data outlined in the work of de Leeuw et al. (2019) to distinguish between coun-
tries that experienced democratic transition (a) in the first half of the 20th century, (b)
in the 1970s, and (c) around the 1990s. Countries with a largely uninterrupted experi-
ence with democracy since the turn of the century were considered “democratic
legacies.” Finally, we use the presence of electoral entry barriers to operationalize the
difficulty for parties to gain a seat in parliament. Given our emphasis on the visibility of
smaller parties, we include a measure that captures the impact of all types of electoral
entry barriers, namely, Gallagher’s Least Square Index (Gallagher and Mitchel, 2005).
High values on this index indicate that smaller parties have been unsuccessful at break-
ing through the electoral threshold, while lower values suggest that parties’ seat and
vote share are similar. The full overview of country-level variables can be found in
Supplementary Appendix Table A.
Individual-level variables. To test individual legacy-effects (i.e., socialization
under authoritarian rule), we leverage within-country variation in individuals’ birth
year. All respondents who turned 18 under authoritarian rule were considered socialized
by that regime. We use the traditional left-right self-placement scale (ranging between 0
“left” and 10 “right”) to construct a categorical variable for ideological extremism: far-
left (0–1 on the original scale), center left (2–4), center (5), center right (6–8), and far-
right (9–10). Third, we focus on political trust as a diffuse form of system support. To
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this end, we constructed a mean scale of five routinely used items (Cronbach’s a ¼
0.895), measuring individuals’ trust in the parliament, the judiciary, political parties,
the police, and politicians. All items ranged between 0 “no trust at all” to 10 “complete
trust.” In addition to these variables, we control for gender, educational attainment,
age, and the wave of the survey. All individual-level variables are summarized in
Table 1.
Analysis strategy. Our data implies at least three possible sources of clustering,
namely, countries, waves, and each country-wave combination. Not taking this cluster-
ing into account would substantially increase the chances of making a Type I error. To
tackle this challenge, we follow the recommendations made by Schmidt-Catran and
Fairbrother (2015). In keeping with their recommendations, we perform multilevel
analyses with individuals strictly nested in country-wave combinations, country-wave
fixed regression coefficients and country-waves cross-classified with countries and
waves.
The sole exception to this rule are the models evaluating the difference in support
between citizens who grew up under authoritarian rule or thereafter. This is challenging
because it is statistically difficult to disentangle socialization or “cohort” effects from
the potentially confounding influences of age and period. A rich literature collected
under the umbrella term “age-period-cohort” analysis resolves this issue by imposing
informed constraints on the specification of these variables in order to reduce the
Table 1.
Summary Statistics Variables
Variable N Mean/Percent SD Min Max
Support for party bans 195,405 2.67 1.15 0 4
Auth. socialization : During 53,176 53.01 0 1
After 47,131 46.99 0 1
Ideology: Far-left 9,341 5.38 0 1
Center-left 46,872 27.00 0 1
Center 57,649 33.21 0 1
Center-right 49,864 28.72 0 1
Far-right 9,865 5.68 0 1
Institutional trust 191,791 5.13 2.60 0 10
Age 194,453 47.4 18.24 13 123
Period: Wave 1 36,364 18.61 0 1
Wave 2 39,041 19.98 0 1
Wave 3 36,321 18.59 0 1
Wave 4 40,987 20.97 0 1
Wave 5 42,692 21.85 0 1
Gender: Male 92,350 47.32 0 1
Female 102,821 52.68 0 1
Years of education 193,415 12.19 4.04 0 56
Source. ESS 2002–2010.
Note. Table only includes respondents for whom we had information regarding their attitudes to party
bans (the dependent variable).
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correlation between them. We use a method proposed by Kritzer (1983) which deals
with this problem by constraining age effects to be linear and period effects to be fixed.
To facilitate a comprehensive and substantive reading of the results, we report
bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs). These intervals are based on an artificially cre-
ated sampling distribution, comprised of random samples with replacements drawn
from the original sample. The lower and upper bounds of these intervals denote the
lowest and highest plausible values of the parameter. Rather than relying on the crude
practice of interpreting p-values (which we do report), we consider a hypothesis fully
supported when the sign of both the upper and lower bound are in keeping with our
expectations. Finally, we center all variables around the country-mean.
Results
Mapping Public Support for Party Bans in Europe
To what degree is the public divided over the use of party bans? And does this mirror
elite responses to political extremism? Figure 1 visualizes the distribution of support for
party bans in countries where in the past elites have responded to extremist parties by
implementing a ban, and in countries where this is not the case.
Figure 1 demonstrates that in virtually every country, citizens supporting the im-
plementation of party bans are in an overwhelming majority. This ranges between 50%
of support in Norway and 85% in Cyprus. This is surprising, given the severely repres-
sive nature of this measure. The second largest share are citizens without a clear opinion
about party bans, which may be attributed to conflicting feelings on, or a general un-
familiarity with, this topic. This means that overall, the percentage of respondents
against party bans is marginal, with 32% opposed in Norway and 5% in Cyprus. In
addition, support for party bans does not seem to mirror elite responses to extremist
parties. Support for party bans is high, irrespective of whether or not countries have
banned a party in the past. This suggests that public opinion has not influenced elite
responses, nor the other way around.
Explaining Support for Party Bans
Before evaluating the country-level hypotheses, we first ask how much variation there is
in support for party bans between countries. An inspection of the intra-class correlation
of an intercept-only model reveals that only 3.87% is located at the country-level while
the remaining 96.13% of the variation can be ascribed to individual characteristics.
When it comes to the evaluation of country-level hypotheses, this finding means that—
even when significant—the effects are admittedly marginal in terms of size. By contrast,
the overwhelming share of individual-level variability is rather promising for our
individual-level hypotheses.
Countries’ resilience. With only 3.87% of the variance located at the country-
level, there is little reason to expect that country-characteristics have a substantial im-
pact on individuals’ support for party bans. To be sure, we estimated a series of analyses
with country-level predictors. The results are displayed in Table 2.
Model 1 evaluates whether support for party bans mirrors patterns of institutional
tolerance toward extremist influences. We expected that support would be higher in
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countries with high levels of institutional intolerance (i.e., substantive democracies)
than elsewhere (Hypothesis 1). Although the effects flow in the expected direction, the
analyses provide little statistical support for this expectation. Not only are the differen-
ces insignificant, the upper bound of the CI suggests that they are minor at best, with
the highest plausible value indicating that citizens in substantive democracies are 0.345
(6.90% of the scale) more supportive than in procedural democracies. In other words,
there is little reason to believe that higher institutional commitment to excluding ex-
tremist voices is also reflected in a higher societal commitment.
In Model 2, we investigate whether support is lower in new democracies with re-
cent experiences with authoritarianism (Hypothesis 2a) and higher in established
Figure 1.
Distribution of support for party bans by country.
Source. ESS 2002–2010.
Note. Figure contains a summary of the responses to the question to what degree respondents
agreed with the following statement: “Parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be
banned.”
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democracies with more distant experiences (Hypothesis 2b) than elsewhere. The data
provide little support for Hypothesis 2a. The CI shows that the opposite claim, namely,
that support is higher in recently transitioned countries, is equally as plausible as
Hypothesis 2a. Even more so, the low value of the upper bound suggests that even if
there were a difference, it is minor at best (6.90% of the scale). We do find some sup-
port for Hypothesis 2b, with citizens in countries with distant experiences with authori-
tarianism (transition in the 1940s) being significantly more supportive than those in
countries with a democratic legacy. The uncertainty of this estimate means that this dif-
ference can be very minor (2.52% of the scale), to substantial (13.48%). Although insig-
nificant, a similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to countries that transitioned in
the 1970s. Combined, these findings suggest that distant experiences are associated with
higher levels of support for party bans, while recent experiences do not result in lower
levels of support.
Model 3 evaluates whether support is higher in countries where extremist parties
have a greater chance of breaking through the electoral threshold, which is the case in
highly proportional systems (Hypothesis 3). Countering our expectations, the data pro-
vide more support for the opposite hypothesis, namely, that higher levels of proportion-
ality are accompanied by lower levels of support for party bans. Even if we were to find
a positive effect, the impact of proportionality is admittedly low, with the highest plaus-
ible difference between countries with the lowest and the highest levels of proportional-
ity being 0.144 (2.88% of the scale). This shows that citizen support for party bans is
not steered by the chances that extremist parties gain electoral ground.
Combined, the analyses confirm the conclusion drawn before, namely, that support
for party bans varies little—if at all—in function of countries’ resilience against political
extremism. Substantively, this implies that party bans are not perceived as more or less
legitimate in democracies where they may be most needed.
Individuals’ orientation toward democratic establishment. With 96.13%
of the variance located at the individual-level, individual predictors may yield much more
promising explanations for support for party bans. The results of the individual-level
analyses are displayed in Table 3. We begin this section with the estimation of an age-
period-cohort (APC) analysis, which allows us to evaluate whether citizens who grew up
under authoritarian rule are less supportive of party bans than citizens who grew up
thereafter (Hypothesis 4). The results depicted in Model 5 provide some support for this
hypothesis. Citizens who grew up under authoritarian rule are significantly less support-
ive of party bans than citizens who grew up thereafter. This difference, however, is rela-
tively minor, with the highest plausible difference being 0.054 points (1.08% of the
scale). Authoritarian tendencies therefore seem to matter, but only to a very small extent.
Second, we expected that individuals whose ideological views are most likely to be
restricted by means of a party ban—that is, those with extremist ideological views—are
less supportive of such measures (Hypothesis 5). Model 6 demonstrates that extremist
orientations are not linked to lower levels of support for party bans. Instead, far-right
citizens are slightly but significantly more supportive of party bans, while far-leftist citi-
zens are no less supportive than centrist citizens. This suggests that there is some rela-
tion with left-right orientation but not with ideological extremism. Citizens therefore
appear to be supportive of party bans, irrespective of whether their preferred ideology is
more likely to be targeted by one.
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Finally, we theorized that antisystem sentiments results in lower support for party
bans (Hypothesis 6). Model 7 suggests that of all individual level predictors, system
support by far has the strongest effect on support for party bans. While still relatively
minor in terms of size, the findings suggest that citizens with the highest levels of sys-
tem support are 0.148 points more supportive (2.96% of the scale) than citizens with
low levels of trust. This shows that citizens’ confidence in institutions involved in the
implementation of bans to some degree influences their support for party bans.
Altogether, there appears to be some support for the idea that individual orienta-
tions toward the democratic establishment affect support for party bans. More remark-
able, however, is how little these attitudinal predictors explain. This is especially
surprising given the amount of variance located at the individual level. This means that
societal polarization over the use of party bans is very limited and that support is high
even among segments of the population that are theoretically the most likely to oppose
such practices.
Discussion
Party bans are the most repressive instrument for curtailing extremist influences in
democratic societies. They do so by undercutting the resources and legitimacy of these
groups. Nevertheless, it has long been speculated that such exclusion measures may also
be counterproductive as they might provoke societal resistance (e.g., Bleich, 2011;
Downs, 2012). Although this argument has repeatedly been made in academic, elite and
media discussions, we know remarkably little about citizen attitudes to party bans.
Analysis of citizen attitudes allowed us to reflect on (a) whether party bans enjoy the le-
gitimacy of majority support and (b) whether the potential benefits outweigh potential
costs in terms of societal resistance.
In spite of the recurring concerns among elites regarding the possible societal resist-
ance against the use of party bans, our study clearly showed that party bans enjoy the le-
gitimacy of majority support in every country. Contrary to our expectations, we found
little evidence that countries’ resilience against extremist influences—resulting from in-
stitutional intolerance, historical experiences with authoritarianism, and high electoral
entry barriers—matters. Instead, support is approximately equally high in countries
that are prone to extremist influences as in countries that are not. These null-findings
are important, because they suggest that support for party bans is widespread. This
means that, where threats to liberal democracy emerge, the option of party bans is not
likely to be counterproductive if elites judge that the weight of normative argument falls
in favor of party bans. In keeping with our expectations, we found some support for the
idea that citizens with more negative orientations toward the democratic establishment,
such as those with authoritarian tendencies, extreme ideological orientations and low
system support, are less supportive of party bans. Nevertheless, even though limited
support for democracy is theoretically the most viable reason to oppose party bans, there
is surprisingly little difference in support between citizens with negative orientations
and that of citizens with positive orientations.
Combined, our findings suggests that one important condition favoring implemen-
tation of the contentious process of party bans is likely to be met everywhere in Europe.
More specifically, it satisfies the theoretical requirement that when framed as a demo-
cratic threat, party bans will be able obtain sufficient popular support, despite the
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gravity of the measure (Bourne, 2018; Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998). Our findings
show that there is overwhelming support for party bans in all countries, even if they are
prone toward extremist influences. Even more so, the limited differences in support for
party bans between citizens with negative and positive orientations toward democratic
establishment shows that this measure is less likely to be contested or result in societal
polarization than commonly assumed. Even citizens with more negative attitudes to-
ward democracy seem to be favorable to measures designed to protect it. Second, these
findings enable us to identify new conditions favoring the implementation of party
bans. Our finding that citizens socialized under authoritarian rule are significantly less
supportive suggests that long-term processes of democratization may alter levels of sup-
port for party bans and thus the likelihood that they be implemented if judged appropri-
ate and necessary.
One limitation of this study is our focus on a single-item dependent variable. This
measure falls short in three respects. First, the measure specifically gauges support for
antidemocratic parties, a group of parties that is relatively marginal and only has limited
impact on the electoral playing field. Second, this measure does not address some of the
most important contemporary challenges to liberal democracy, such as the upsurge of
anti-immigrant, radical right, populist parties. These new challenges often take on the
form of parties promoting or implementing “democratic backsliding,” where democratic
institutions are weakened rather than overthrown altogether. This means that individu-
als’ response to this question may be at least partly shaped by their conception of what
overthrowing democracy entails. Finally, it is important to note that this item focuses
on one instrument of democratic defense, thereby making generalizations to other wide-
ly employed instruments, such as hate speech legislation, unwarranted. In light of these
methodological shortcomings, it is clear that further research is needed to examine the
validity of our findings in relation to other instruments of militant democracy, although
we are unaware of any other cross-national surveys examining such measures.
In addition to this methodological limitation, it is also important to stress the theor-
etical shortcomings and avenues for future research. Although our study provides novel
and informative insights in how support for party bans is distributed, it remains ex-
ploratory. As such, we have been unable to address important topics such as how proc-
esses of “democratic slippage” affects support for party bans. This is important because
studies in the literature on political tolerance have observed that “slippage” often occurs
between generally high support for principled protection of fundamental rights and less
tolerant attitudes invoked when confronting specific instances of extremism (Gibson,
2013; Lindner & Nosek, 2004). Direct application of this concept to party bans is admit-
tedly complex, given that bans’ highly repressive nature blurs certainty about whether
support is a measure protecting or undermining civil liberties. Further experimental re-
search designed to uncover differences between principled support for party bans and
political tolerance in specific instances could help address this point.
The “democratic backlash” observed in countries such as Hungary and Poland
shows striking similarities with tactics of “legal revolution,” with democratically
induced constitutional changes aimed at weakening fundamental democratic institu-
tions. The strong electoral support for these politicians suggests that there is sufficient
ambiguity about their democratic credentials. It is therefore unclear whether such high
levels of support for banning “extremist” parties may carry over to such cases. At the
same time, the effects of “democratic backsliding” and illiberal judicial reforms, over
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the long term, may undermine support for banning parties if they entail increasing sym-
pathy for proto-authoritarian forms of “managed democracy” or a loss of support for
democratic establishment. These are additional questions for further research.
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